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FELONY MURDER AND CHILD ABUSE: A
PROPOSAL FOR THE NEW YORK
LEGISLATURE
I. Introduction
Lisa Steinberg's head was hit so hard her injuries matched those of
a person who had fallen out of a three-story window.' Over the
course of three months, investigators believed that Jessica Cortez was
beaten numerous times with fists, a ruler, and a belt by her mother's
companion who, in addition, sexually abused her.2 Lisa and Jessica
are only two of the many New York City children who have died as a
result of child abuse in recent years; at least 126 other children died at
the hands of abusive adults in 1988 alone.3 This alarming and ever-
increasing statistic demonstrates the significant need for the criminal
justice system to protect children from abuse.'
In the past decade, the annually reported instances of child mal-
treatment increased dramatically, from 669,000 in 1976 to over 1.9
million in 1985.' There is a growing public sentiment,6 largely trig-
1. N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 30, 1988 at 3, col. 1. Lisa Steinberg was illegally adopted by
Joel Steinberg, a New York criminal defense lawyer, who was convicted of first degree
manslaughter. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1989, at Al, col. 1. At the age of 6, she died from a
subdural hematoma, a hemorrhage in the outer covering of the brain, which caused her
brain to swell and crush against the skull. N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 30, 1988, at 3, ol. 1.
2. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at BI, col 5. Jessica's mother and Adrian Lopez,
her companion, were charged with murdering Jessica, her body was found to have "nu-
merous bruises over her entire body, her face and head, a broken left arm, a possible skull
fracture, a two-inch ulcerated scar of her lip and bruises to her sexual area." Id. Lopez
was sentenced to 22 years to life in prison after pleading guilty to charges of murder,
assault and endangering the welfare of a child. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1989, at B3,
col. 6.
3. See N.Y. Post, Jan. 5, 1989, at 22, col. 1. Child welfare officials reported a stag-
gering 52% increase in drug-related child abuse and child neglect complaints in the
twelve months ending June 30, 1988. Overall, New York City child protection services
investigated some 58,300 cases in 1988. About one-third were found to have been justi-
fied. There were 21,000 children in city-sponsored foster care as of December 31, 1988 -
many of them victims of abuse. Id.
4. Armstrong & Gillig, Responding to Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: The
Kentucky Approach, 16 N. KENT. L. REv. 17 (1988) [hereinafter Armstrong]. "The
state's obligation to its youngest citizens is that ofparenspatriae, the ultimate parent, and
is strongest where its charges, by virtue of their age, are most vulnerable". Id. at 20.
5. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
6. Id. "The growing public awareness of the prevalence of child... abuse has only
recently been accompanied by increased sensitivity to the trauma that the child victim
experiences from the criminal justice system itself." Id. at B2, col. 1. In 1984, of every
thousand Kentucky two-year olds, 19 were known victims of neglect, six were physically
abused, two were mentally or emotionally abused, and one was sexually abused. Id. In
New York State, there were approximately 95,000 child abuse cases reported in 1986.
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gered by the highly-publicized, tragic deaths of six-year-old Lisa and
five-year-old Jessica, that the criminal laws ought to punish more se-
verely those who commit such heinous crimes.
The charges most often brought against the abuser when the victim
dies is intentional homicide, depraved mind murder, or in some states,
felony murder, in which child abuse is the underlying predicate fel-
ony.' A conviction for intentional homicide is difficult to obtain.
First, the government must prove intent to cause death,' a factor
often absent in child abuse cases.9 Second, frequently the sole witness
is the abuser, since such crimes usually occur in private.' 0 Moreover,
Too often, however, the system - the official network of social workers, counselors, and
family court officers - fails. 10,000 children in the state suffer serious physical harm each
year from beatings, scalding and other abuse, and 100 to 150 die. The large majority of
those who die are very young children, generally two- and three-year-olds. Experts say
the very fact that 100 children die of abuse in the city each year should be warning that
changes are needed. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
The numbers of abuse reports (cases nearly doubled between 1986 and 1989) and the
erosion of families by drug abuse have overwhelmed the Special Services for Children
agency. As a result, there are, too often, errors in determining whether a child should be
removed from a household. Since June 1988, the agency has hired 614 caseworkers who
are doing protective investigations to determine the validity of abuse reports. There are
now roughly 1,000 caseworkers and the average caseload per caseworker is 18.9 com-
pared with 35 in the prior year. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1989, at Bl, col. 3.
7. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1988). New York defines an indi-
vidual who is guilty of second degree murder as:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person...
2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
person and thereby causes the death of another person; or
3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or
attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first de-
gree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, escape in the
first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in further-
ance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant,
if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants.
Id.
8. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1988).
9. See Reich, Lisa: betrayed by the law, Glamour Magazine, April, 1989, at 195
[hereinafter Reich]. "Prosecutors are. . . required to provide witnesses, as well as estab-
lish a motive and intent to kill, just as they would if an adult were murdered. Usually
they can't - child abuse being the most private of tortures - so child killers are most
often convicted of manslaughter, as was Joel Steinberg, and get a considerably lighter
sentence." Id.
10. See Reich, supra, note 9. Charles Reich, the executive director of The LISA Or-
ganization to stop Child Abuse, Inc., in New York City, expressed his horror regarding
the current inadequacies of penalizing child abusers in New York. He said that prosecu-
tors are required to provide witnesses and establish an intent to kill but that this is rarely
possible since child abuse is the "most private of tortures." Id. The government must
often prove that the death occurred under circumstances evincing depraved indifference
to human life, as an alternative to intent to kill, in order to obtain a second degree murder
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it is difficult to convince a jury that a parent intentionally killed his
child.'" In fact, the government did not even attempt to charge Joel
Steinberg, Lisa Steinberg's abuser, with intentional murder because of
.these difficulties.12 A conviction for depraved indifference to human
life13 is similarly difficult to prove.' 4 In such a case, the prosecution
must prove that "[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indiffer-
ence to human life, . . . [the defendant] recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby
causes the death of another person."'" This standard can be confus-
ing to the jury because the terms "depraved indifference to human
life""6 and "a grave risk of death"' 7 are very subjective and not easily
definable. 18 Moreover, a jury might confuse these terms with those
associated with manslaughter in the first degree. 9 A person is guilty
of manslaughter in the first degree when, "[w]ith intent to cause seri-
ous physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person. "20 Thus, in the Steinberg case, it is quite
conviction. However, this concept often confuses jurors as to its meaning, especially
when the government is attempting to prove that a parent showed depraved indifference
to the life of his or her own child. It is precisely such a situation that the felony murder
doctrine is intended to deter.
The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that child abuse that results in death cannot be
prosecuted as a felony murder. Robert T. Stephen, Attorney General of Kansas, empha-
sized the problems proving intent in such cases: "It's going to weaken our prosecution in
[child abuse] cases ... [and] [i]t's not likely you can get a first-degree murder conviction
in such cases because of the necessity of proving premeditation." Nat'l L.J., July 25,
1988, at 6, col. 1.
11. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
12. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
13. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 1988).
14. Steinberg's defense lawyer, Gerald Lefcourt, explained the difficulty in proving
depraved mind murder to the jury in such a case. He stated that "it would have been
difficult for jurors to agree on depraved indifference both because the legal concept is
difficult to understand and because it is difficult to apply to the circumstances of the
Steinberg case." N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 31, 1989 at 22, col. 1.
15. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 1988).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1988).
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes
the death of such person or of a third person;
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute
murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
Id.
20. Id.
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possible that in convicting Joel Steinberg of first degree manslaughter,
and acquitting him of second degree depraved mind murder, the jury
had difficulty distinguishing the two offenses.21
The felony murder rule, on the other hand, requires the govern-
ment to prove only the underlying crime.22 The rule imputes the req-
uisite intent for a murder conviction to one who commits a homicide
during the perpetration of another felony.2 3 This simplifies the task
for the jury since the underlying crimes frequently involve clearer
standards than those of intentional or depraved mind murder.24 In
New York, an individual perpetrates the crime of felony murder
when:
[a]cting either alone or with one or more other persons, he com-
mits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson,
rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in
the first degree, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second
degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of
immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be
any, -causes the death of a person other than one of the
participants.25
Although child abuse is as dangerous a crime as these predicate of-
fenses, 26 New York's felony murder statute does not recognize child
abuse as a predicate offense.27
Crimes involving child abuse are contained in New York Penal
Law section 260.10(1), which declares a person guilty of "endanger-
ing the welfare of a child" when "[h]e knowingly acts in a manner
likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a
male child less than sixteen years old or a female child less than sev-
21. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1988, at A1, col. 1. Indeed, the jury foreman told the
press after the verdict that it was a very difficult vote because of the difficult issues of law
and fact. Id. at B5, col. 1. Some jurors noted that the panel might have become a hungjury if it not had the option of first-degree manslaughter. Id. at Al, col. 2. Some jurors,
though believing that Steinberg was guilty of murder, voted to acquit him on it to avoid a
deadlock that would lay waste the effort of a three-month trial. Id. Moreover, a consult-
ant, in explaining why the jurors had voted to acquit Steinberg on the second degree
murder count, said, "[wie felt there was a lack of proof of his depravity." Id. at B5, col.
1.
22. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
23. See Comment, Merger & The California Felony-Murder Rule, 20 UCLA L. REV.
250 (1972) [hereinafter Comment].
24. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1988).
26. Id.
27. See Nat'l L.J., July 25, 1988, at 6, col. 1; see generally N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25(3) (McKinney 1988);
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enteen years old ... "28 This offense, a class A misdemeanor,29 en-
compasses a wide range of conduct, including negligence, neglect,
malnutrition, dehydration, physical torture, and a pattern of abuse.
Because the offense includes active as well as passive activity, and vio-
lent as well as non-violent activity, 30 inclusion of it in the felony mur-
der statute may, in some cases, impute too much liability. New York
should thus follow the lead of other jurisdictions, which have distin-
guished different types of child abuse by specifying some as felonies
and others as misdemeanors.31
This Note urges that the New York legislature adopt an "aggra-
vated child abuse" statute, and proposes an amendment to the current
felony murder statute to include the crime of "aggravated child
abuse" as an underlying felony to support a felony murder charge.
Part II discusses the felony murder rationale and examines its limita-
tions. Part III articulates a new aggravated child abuse statute that
should serve as an underlying felony for felony murder in New York.
Finally, the Note concludes with legislative recommendations which
would make easier the prosecution and conviction of child abusers as
well as severely punish child abusers under the proposed statutory
amendments.
II. Felony Murder Rationale and Its Limitations
A. Background of Felony Murder
The felony murder rule imputes the actor's culpable mental state in
committing a felony to any homicide that occurs in furtherance of or
during the commission of the felony. 32 The rule, therefore, permits a
murder conviction for an unintentional or accidental killing that oc-
curred during the commission of an unrelated felonious offense.33
28. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1988).
29. Id. at § 260.10(2).
30. Id. at § 260.10(1).
31. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 827.03-827.06 (West 1988); Wis. STAT. § 940.201 (1985-
86); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273a, 273d (West 1988).
32. See Note, The California Supreme Court Assaults the Felony-Murder Rule, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1970) [hereinafter Note]. See Note, People v. Dillon: Felony Murder
in California, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 546 (1985) (authored by Miller) [hereinafter Miller].
The most common felonies which will support a conviction for felony murder under the
usual state statute include rape, armed robbery, arson, and kidnapping. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25(3) (McKinney 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 782.04 (West 1990). Assault is never on the list, whereas child abuse is sometimes on
the underlying felony murder list. Id.
33. See Note, Felony Murder in Texas: The Merger Problem, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
1035 (1981) (authored by Stewart) [hereinafter Stewart].
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1. Policy Rationales
Although disfavored by many scholars, 46 out of 50 states recog-
nized that the felony murder doctrine responds to certain policy
goals, and consequently have adopted versions of the felony murder
rule.34 The felony murder rule is invaluable in meeting community
and law enforcement goals. 3' The felony murder doctrine reflects the
widespread public perception that death resulting from robbery, rape,
or similar violent felonies is not simply a more serious version of these
underlying acts. The death is perceived as the result of a qualitatively
different crime, more comparable in seriousness to intentional mur-
der, than to homicides such as vehicular manslaughter.3 6 In fact, a
recent study indicated that juries generally do not resist convicting
under the felony murder doctrine, except where the possibility of the
death penalty exists.3
2. Deterrent Rationale
Deterrence is another argument proffered in favor of the felony
murder rule.38 Some scholars dismiss the rule's deterrent effect, opin-
ing that criminals who intend to commit the underlying felony are
often unaware of the law. 39 Nevertheless, courts emphasize the deter-
rent effect of the felony murder rule. In People v. Washington,"° the
California Supreme Court explained that the "purpose of the felony-
murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally
by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit."'"
34. See Crump & Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 359, 360 n.4 (1985) [hereinafter Crump].
35. Id. at 363.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 365 n.22.
38. Id. at 369.
39. Id. at 370. See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW
PROCESSES 479 (4th ed. 1983) ("Principled argument in its defense is hard to find."); R.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 44 (2d ed. 1969) (asserting that "the reason for the rule has
ceased to exist"); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HORNBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 560-61
(1972) ("it is arguable that there should be no such separate category of murder").
40. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
41. Id. at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445; In Washington, the defendant
was convicted of first degree murder based on felony murder. The underlying felony was
his participation in a robbery where his accomplice was killed by the victim of the rob-
bery. The Supreme Court of California reversed the first degree murder conviction on
the ground that "[t]o impose an additional penalty for the killing would discriminate
between robbers, not on the basis of any difference in their own conduct, but solely on the
basis of the response by others that the robber's conduct happened to induce. An addi-
tional penalty for a homicide committed by the victim would deter robbery haphazardly
at best." Id. at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
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Similarly, in People v. Miller,42 the New York Court of Appeals
emphasized that the purpose of felony murder is "to reduce the dis-
proportionate number of accidental homicides which occur during the
commission of the enumerated predicate felonies. . ."'I In People v.
Benson," the trial court summarized the deterrent rationale for the
felony murder rule:
[t]he Legislature has said in effect that this deterrent purpose out-
weighs the normal legislative policy of examining the individual
state of mind of each person causing an unlawful killing to deter-
mine whether the killing was with or without malice, deliberate or
accidental, and calibrating our treatment of the person accord-
ingly. Once a person perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate one of
the enumerated felonies, then in the judgment of the Legislature,
he is no longer entitled to such fine judicial calibration, but will be
deemed guilty of first degree murder for any homicide committed
in the course thereof.45
3. Jury Deliberations/Predictability
The felony murder rule also provides juries with a clear and rela-
tively straightforward standard to guide their deliberations.46 In New
York's felony murder statute, the prosecutor must merely prove that
the underlying felony has been committed or attempted, 47 and that,
"in the course of and in furtherance of such crime," the defendant or
another participant caused the death of a person.48 The state is not
required to prove an intent to murder49 or depraved indifference to
human life. 50 Instructions that require the jury to distinguish homici-
dal mental states are a source of confusion and may render verdicts
based more on a misapplication of complex law than on a proper as-
sessment of evidence presented at trial.5' Intent to murder can be
difficult to prove to a jury, particularly when the murderous action is
spontaneous, quick and results from the defendant's intangible
"mental impulses."52 If properly defined, a felony murder instruction
42. 32 N.Y.2d 157, 297 N.E.2d 85, 344 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1973).
43. Id. at 161, 297 N.E.2d at 87, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
44. 125 Misc. 2d 843, 480 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1984).
45. Id. at 847, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 814 (quoting in part People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375,
378, 491 P.2d 793, 801, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1971)).
46. See Crump, supra note 34, at 372.
47. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1987).
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Crump, supra note 34, at 372.
52. Id.
389
390 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
relieves the jury from having to distinguish the nuances among intent,
depraved indifference and criminal negligence.53
Thus, the felony murder rule is beneficial in that "it clearly defines
the offense, [and] simplifies the task of the judge and jury with respect
to questions of law and fact."
54
B. Limitations and Justifications
Although a majority of states employs some form of the felony
murder doctrine," states have limited the rule in different ways. 56
1. Enumerated and Unenumerated Statutes
Generally, the felony murder rule operates in two different con-
texts. Some state felony murder statutes expressly list the felonies
that may support a felony murder charge ("enumerated statutes"),"
53. See id. "The mental state of intention to commit robbery, rape, or kidnapping is
less ambiguous that the terms generally governing homicidal mental states." Id.
54. Id. at 375. The California Supreme Court in People v. Burton explained this
rationale:
The Legislature has said in effect that this deterrent purpose [of the felony mur-
der rule] outweighs the normal legislative policy of examining the individual
state of mind of each person causing an unlawful killing to determine whether
the killing was with or without malice, deliberate or accidental, and calibrating
our treatment of the person accordingly. Once a person perpetrates or attempts
to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies, then in the judgment of the Legis-
lature, he is no longer entitled to such fine judicial calibration, but will be
deemed guilty of first degree murder for any homicide committed in the course
thereof.
6 Cal. 3d 375, 388, 491 P.2d 793, 801-02, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9-10 (1971).
55. See Miller, supra note 32, at 547; Adlerstein, Felony-Murder in the New Criminal
Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249, 250 (1975-76); Siebold, The Felony Murder Rule: In
Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW. 133, 134 (1978).
56. See Roth & Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine At Constitutional
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985).
Few legal doctrines have been as maligned and yet have shown as great a resili-
ency as the felony-murder rule. Criticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon of
everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine: it has
been described as "astonishing" and "monstrous," an unsupportable "legal fic-
tion," "an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal law," and as an "anachro-
nistic remnant" that has "no logical or practical basis for existence in modern
law."
Id.
A vast majority of states maintain the felony murder rule, even in the face of wide-
spread criticism. Id. Kentucky and Hawaii have abolished the rule by statute. HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 701-707 (1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1990). Michigan has eliminated the rule by judicial decision. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich.
672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
57. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1987) (lists predicate offenses,
such as rape in the first degree, robbery and kidnapping which support a felony murder
charge but omits child abuse from its list of underlying felonies). Florida considers ag-
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while other states use felony murder schemes which provide that any
felony will suffice to support a felony murder conviction ("unenumer-
ated statutes").58 Although the felony murder rule originally applied
to "any felony," 9 the majority of states that have a felony murder
rule implement it by enumerated statute.' New York is one such
state.6' The 1967 Penal Law limited the application of the felony
murder rule to nine serious and violent felonies. The underlying ra-
tionale of including certain crimes as predicates to felony murder is
summarized as follows:
[w]hat the enumerated felonies always seem to have in common is
the element of danger or violence. By holding a felony-murderer
strictly accountable, even though the homicide is unintended, the
law is attempting to protect innocent lives - victims, law enforce-
ment officers, bystanders. The law is not attempting merely to de-
ter the commission of dangerous or violent felonies; presumably,
the punishment authorized by law for such felonies is sufficiently
severe to accomplish that purpose. But rather, the law is attempt-
ing to deter the commission of such felonies in a dangerous or vio-
lent way.62
gravated child abuse a specific underlying felony that supports a charge of first degree
felony murder. A charge of felony murder may be brought against one who either a)
commits aggravated battery on a child; b) willfully tortures a child; c) maliciously pun-
ishes a child; or d) willfully and unlawfully cages a child. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 782.04(2)(h), 827.03 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990).
Even prior to Florida's 1989 addition of aggravated child abuse to its list of underlying
felonies, the Florida courts had consistently held that fatal child abuse did not merge
with the homicide and thus may serve as an underlying felony for felony murder. See
Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979); Mapps v. State, 520 So. 2d 92 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988). In Mapps, the court upheld a felony murder conviction predicated on
aggravated child abuse. In Mapps, the defendant was convicted of killing his ten-month
old child by throwing, shaking, and striking the child, causing a fractured skull. 520 So.
2d at 94.
58. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 273d (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c)
(1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1988). Moreover, several states have first-degree
murder statutes and lesser included offenses encompassing "all other murder." In such a
statute, it is possible that unlisted felonies will be held to suffice for felony murder of that
lesser degree. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HORNBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 625 (2d ed.
1986).
59. See McQuillan, Felony Murder and the Misdemeanor of Attempted Escape: A
Legislative Error in Search of Correction, 15 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 821 (1986-87) [here-
inafter McQuillan].
60. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1987).
61. Id. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
62. People ex rel. Culhane v. Sullivan, 139 A.D.2d 315, 319, 531 N.Y.S.2d 287, 289
(2d Dep't 1988).
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2 Inherently Dangerous to Human Life
Other limitations have been imposed on the felony murder doc-
trine, applicable to both enumerated statutes and unenumerated stat-
utes, to prevent abuse by the prosecution.63 In People v. Williams,
the California Supreme Court discussed the inherently dangerous to
human life limitation:6
[the felony murder rule] has little relevance to a felony which is not
inherently dangerous. If the felony is not inherently dangerous it is
highly improbable that the potential felon will be deterred; he will
not anticipate that any injury or death might arise solely from the
fact that he will commit the felony.66
In determining whether a felony is inherently dangerous, a court
must view the felony in the abstract. This means that the court must
not look to the specific facts of the underlying act in assessing danger-
ousness, but rather "to the genus of crimes known as felonies and
determine whether the [commission of the act] by one who has been
convicted of any crime within that genus is an act inherently danger-
ous to human life which, as such, justifies the extreme consequence
(i.e., imputed malice) which the felony-murder doctrine demands. ' 6
This analysis is necessary because every case where the rule might
potentially be applied involves a killing.68 If a court examines the
particular facts of the case prior to establishing whether the underly-
ing felony is inherently dangerous, the court might conclude that it is
inherently dangerous simply because the victim died.69
Thus, the primary element of the underlying offense must first be
reviewed. Then the court determines "whether the felony, taken in
the abstract, is inherently dangerous to human life, or whether it pos-
sibly could be committed without creating such peril."7 Deterrence
is the major rationale for the felony murder rule; therefore, applica-
tion of the rule should not include a felony that does not comport
63. See Comment, supra note 23, at 250; Stewart, supra note 33, at 1036.
64. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965) (quoting 2 WHARTON, CRIM-
INAL LAW § 145 (14th ed. 1979).
65. Stewart, supra note 33, at 1036. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
66. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 457-58 n.4, 406 P.2d at 650 n.4, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.4 (1965)
(citations omitted). See also People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 414 P.2d 353, 361, 51
Cal. Rptr. 225, 233 (1966).
67. People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 40, 489 P.2d 1361, 1369, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 41
(1971).
68. See People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 830, 678 P.2d 894, 897, 201 Cal. Rptr.
319, 322 (1984).
69. Id. at 830, 678 P.2d at 897-98, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23.
70. Id. at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323; see People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d
28, 39-40, 489 P.2d 1361, 1369, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 41 (1971).
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with the rationale for the rule.7
3. The Merger Doctrine
In states with unenumerated felony murder statutes, courts can
limit application of the felony murder rule by using the "merger doc-
trine."' 72 The merger doctrine treats certain felonious acts as integral
parts of the resulting homicides, precluding their use as underlying
offenses for felony murder prosecutions.7 3 A felonious act is said to
"merge" with a homicide when the predicate crime lacks an in-
dependent or collateral 74 purpose distinct from the homicide.75 For
example, assault 76 is a crime that is consistently held to merge with
the homicide. Many homicides result from felonious assaults. When
assault, however, is considered in conjunction with murder, it is diffi-
cult to differentiate between the intent to injure and the intent to
kill.77 If the felony murder rule were applicable to a simple assault
that resulted in death, the prosecution would be able to obtain a mur-
der conviction simply by proving the intent to cause injury. 78 This
could eliminate entirely the category of manslaughter.79 When the
underlying felony is so closely related to the homicidal conduct,80 a
court, in applying the merger doctrine, will not impute the intent to
kill from that felony.8"
71. See Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 457-58 n.4, 406 P.2d 647, 650 n.4, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7,
10 n.4 (1965).
Allowing a felony which is an integral part of the homicide to activate the
felony murder rule will allow the jury to ignore the issue of malice in those cases
- a majority of homicides - where there has been a felonious assault upon the
victim. Since many homicides involve a felonious assault, this application of the
rule provides the prosecution with an open option to proceed on a felony mur-
der theory.
Comment, supra note 23, at 259.
72. See Stewart, supra note 33, at 1036.
73. See Miller, supra note 32, at 548.
74. "Collateral" is defined as:
Additional or auxiliary; supplementary; co-operating; accompanying as a secon-
dary fact, or acting as a secondary agent. Related to, complementary; accompa-
nying as a co-ordinate.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990).
75. See Stewart, supra note 33, at 1036.
76. Assault in the third degree is defined as "[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to
another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 1987).
77. See McQuillan, supra note 59, at 860.
78. Id.
79. Id. See People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 159-60, 297 N.E.2d 85, 87-88, 344
N.Y.S.2d 342, 344-45 (1973); McQuillan, supra note 59, at 860 n.193, 873 n.261.
80. See McQuillan, supra note 59, at 860.
81. See id.
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In states with enumerated statutes courts rarely apply the merger
doctrine because the legislature has predetermined the crimes that
will support a felony murder conviction. 2 The merger doctrine is rel-
evant, however, in the threshold determination of whether or not to
include a crime in the enumerated statutes.13 The decision to include
a particular felony among the predicate felonies in an enumerated
statute must be made so as not to render the felony murder rule a tool
of abuse.8 4 If a felony that is an integral part of the homicide is per-
mitted to support a felony murder instruction, a jury would almost
never have to address the issue of intent to murder."5 Thus, for the
very same reasons that it is said to merge with homicide in the context
of unenumerated statutes, assault is uniformly excluded from enumer-
ated statutes as well. In People v. Ireland,s6 the California Supreme
Court held that:
to allow [assault to be used as an underlying felony in connection
with] the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury
from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases
wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious
assault - a category which includes the great majority of all homi-
cides. This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor
in law. We therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder in-
struction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony
which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence
produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in
fact within the offense charged.8 7
In People v. Miller,"' the New York court held that "[s]ince a fortiori,
every homicide, not excusable or justified, occurs during the commis-
82. See People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 297 N.E.2d 85, 344 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1973).
Indeed, the court refused to extend the merger doctrine where there was a burglary based
on intent to assault, because the doctrine was developed to remedy a fundamental defect
in the old felony-murder statute (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (Consol. 1909)). Under that
statute, any felony, including assault, could be the predicate for a felony murder. Since
every homicide occurs during the commission of assault, every homicide would constitute
a felony murder. This defect was remedied by the Legislature in 1965 by including in the
revised Penal Law a list of specified felonies having a basis for felony murder. The legis-
lative purpose for the limitation was " 'to exclude from felony murder, cases of accidental
or not reasonably foreseeable fatality occurring in an unlikely manner in the course of a
non-violent felony.'" 32 N.Y.2d at 159-60, 297 N.E.2d at 87-88, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 345
(quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975)).
83. See Miller, supra note 32, at 548.
84. See Comment, supra note 23, at 259.
85. Id. See People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 539, 450 P.2d 580, 590, 75 Cal. Rptr.
188, 198 (1969).
86. 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969).
87. Id. at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
88. 32 N.Y.2d 157, 297 N.E.2d 85, 344 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1973).
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sion of assault, every homicide would constitute a felony murder."' 9
III. Child Abuse as an Underlying Felony in New York
A. Current Problems Prosecuting Fatal Child Abuse and an
Aggravated Child Abuse Proposal
Florida's Penal Law defines "aggravated child abuse" as a felony in
the second degree;9' "child abuse" as a felony in the third degree or a
misdemeanor in the first degree;9 "negligent treatment of children"
as a misdemeanor in the second degree;92 and "persistent nonsupport"
as a misdemeanor in the first degree.93
Florida's legislature has apparently distinguished the wide variety
of child abuse according to degrees of maliciousness and negligence,
activeness and passiveness, and violence and non-violence. Willful
89. Id. at 160, 297 N.E.2d at 88, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 345. In People v. Moran, 246 N.Y.
100 (1927), the court held that the felonious assault on a police officer was not independ-
ent of the homicide but was the homicide itself. The court stated that "[t]he felony that
eliminates the quality of the intent must be one that is independent of the homicide and of
the assault merged therein, as, e.g., robbery or larceny or burglary or rape." Id. at 102.
90. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03 (West 1990) which defines "aggravated child
abuse" as:
one or more acts committed by a person who:
(a) Commits aggravated battery on a child;
(b) Willfully tortures a child;
(c) Maliciously punishes a child; or
(d) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child.
(2) A person who commits aggravated child abuse is guilty of a felony of the
second degree ....
91. Id. Florida defines "child abuse" as:
(1) Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or al-
lows a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical
treatment, or who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, inflicts or permits the
infliction of physical or mental injury to the child, and in so doing causes great
bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to such child,
shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree ....
(2) Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or al-
lows a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical
treatment, or who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, inflicts or permits the
infliction of physical or mental injury to the child, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor of the first degree ....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04 (West 1990).
92. Id. § 827.05 defines "negligent treatment of children" as:
Whoever, though financially able, negligently deprives a child of, or allows a
child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing.., or permits a child to live in
an environment, when such deprivation or environment causes the child's phys-
ical or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being
significantly impaired shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.
93. Id. § 827.06 defines one guilty of "persistent nonsupport" as: "[a]ny person who,
after notice, fails to provide support which he is able to provide to children ... shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. . ...t
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torture of a child is a felony, whereas willful or negligent deprivation
of food, shelter, clothing or medical treatment is a misdemeanor.
Further, in Florida, aggravated child abuse serves as an underlying
felony in its felony murder statute. In Mapps v. State,94 the defend-
ant's throwing, shaking, and striking caused the death of a ten-month
old child. The Florida court held that "[i]t is obvious that our legisla-
ture did not intend that the felonies specified in the felony-murder
statute merge with the homicide to prevent conviction of the more
serious charge of first-degree murder."95
By contrast, New York's one child abuse statute includes without
distinction, both active and passive conduct, and violent and non-vio-
lent conduct. 96 Moreover, section 260.10 characterizes all such con-
duct as "endangering the welfare of a child," punishable only as a
misdemeanor. 97 A statute such as New York's "Endangering the wel-
fare of a child," which encompasses every type of child abuse, can be
vague and indefinite. 9 For example, in People v. Villacis,99 the court
held that Penal Law section 260.10(1) "is vague in describing prohib-
ited conduct."' ° That section makes a person guilty of endangering
the welfare of a child when he/she knowingly acts in a manner likely
to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child.
The court emphasized that the statute covers a wide range of potential
acts, and its vagueness as to the prohibited conduct allows arbitrary
or discriminatory police enforcement.' 0 In holding the statute un-
constitutional, the court stated that "Penal Law section 260.10(1) is
not sufficiently definite in that it fails to give a reasonable person sub-
ject to it, notice of the nature of what conduct is prohibited and what
conduct is required of him or her."' 1 2
Section 260.10(1) was not originally intended to protect children
from violent physical abuse in their homes. The legislative history
indicates that the intent of the 1970 Amendment to Penal Law section
260.10(1) was to aid in the prosecution of those who exploit young
people, particularly female runaways. 0 3 Because physical violence
and torture of children were not subject to wide publicity, it is under-
94. 520 So. 2d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
95. Mapps, 520 So. 2d at 93.
96. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (McKinney 1989).
97. Id. at § 260.10(2) (McKinney 1989).
98. See People v. Villacis, 143 Misc. 2d 568, 541 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.
1989).
99. 143 Misc. 2d 568, 541 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1989).
100. Id. at 572, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 572, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
103. See NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, ch. 389 (1970). In recent years,
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standable that the legislature drafted the section, "Endangering the
welfare of a child," as it did. Now that violent crimes against children
have become widely publicized, however, the legislature must respond
by drafting a new statute specifically designed to protect children
from repeated in-home physical abuse and torture.
Specifically, the legislature should adopt a more carefully and spe-
cifically worded statute that addresses today's concerns. And, the pe-
nal sanctions must be more severe for active child abuse that is likely
to result in death. This Note proposes the adoption of the following
statute, which makes the most violent and dangerous acts of child
abuse felonies:
A person is guilty of "Aggravated child abuse" when such per-
son:
(a) commits a pattern of aggravated battery
upon a child;
(b) intentionally tortures a child; or
(c) maliciously punishes or maliciously disci-
plines a child.
A person who subjects a child to such cruel maltreatment, in-
cluding but not limited to, severe bruising, lacerations, frac-
tured bones, burns, internal injuries or any injury constituting
great bodily harm, is guilty of a felony in the first degree.04
B. Merger Doctrine Should Not Prevent the New York
Legislature from Amending the Felony Murder List to
Include Child Abuse
1. Child abuse is analogous to existing predicate felonies.
The merger doctrine is rarely applied by courts in states with enu-
merated felony murder statutes since those legislatures have predeter-
mined which crimes will serve as felony murder predicates.105
Therefore, once a legislature enumerates a particular crime on its fel-
ony murder list, a court in that state will rarely consider whether such
a crime merged with the homicide.1° 6 Although New York is a state
with an enumerated felony statute, the merger doctrine should not
preclude child abuse from being added to the list of predicate felonies.
Child abuse should be included in New York's felony murder statute
because of its close analogy to existing predicate felonies, particularly
New York City officials have found that adults exploit and victimize young visitors. Such
conduct impairs the children's physical and moral welfare.
104. See Wis. STAT. § 940.201 (1985-86).
105. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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rape 0 7 and robbery. 10  One common theme is the inherent danger-
ousness involved with each of the crimes. 'I In People v. Benson ,110
the court stated that the New York State Legislature had clearly de-
termined that only felonies involving violence or substantial risk of
serious injury or death should provide a basis for felony murder."1
Like robbery and rape, some forms of child abuse are inherently
dangerous to human life. In particular, the very language of the pro-
posed "aggravated child abuse" statute implies strongly that any vio-
lation of it would be per se inherently dangerous." 2 Aggravated
battery, torture, or malicious punishment or malicious disciplining of
a child cannot possibly be committed without creating such peril." 3
Clearly, if a crime such as armed robbery is deemed "inherently dan-
gerous" even though no injury or death need result from it, aggra-
vated child abuse must logically be considered inherently dangerous
as well. This is because injury must result to even trigger the
statute. 114
Since felony murder applies to rape in virtually every enumerated
felony murder statute,"' it should apply as well to child abuse. The
acts involved in rape, armed robbery, or child abuse involve a high
probability that an accidental homicide will result." 6 If the felony
107. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975).
108. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
109. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.35, 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975). In People v. Jack-
son, 109 Misc. 2d 582, 440 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 1981), the court held that:
[t]he history of New York's felony murder statute furnishes the court with the
Legislature's thinking regarding certain violent crimes.... Under the current
felony murder statute, subdivision 3 of section 125.25 of the Penal Law, the
crime of murder in the second degree is narrowed by the enumeration of a list of
specified felonies-all involving violence or a substantial risk of physical in-
jury-as the only ones forming a basis for felony murder. Rape in the first
degree is one of the enumerated felonies that the Legislature thought involved
violence or a substantial risk of physical injury.
Id. at 584, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
110. 125 Misc. 2d 843, 480 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1984).
111. Id. at 849, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
112. See Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 678 P.2d at 896-97, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22;
Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d at 36-40, 489 P.2d at 1367-69, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 39-41.
113. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
116. See Jackson, 109 Misc. 2d 582, 440 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 1981).
"Civil rights and women's rights groups have long been aware of the problems that wo-
men as potential victims of nonconsensual sex offenses faced in terms of proving the guilt
of sex offenders." Id. at 585, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
Thus, "in 1974, the legislature recognized some of these problems and eliminated the
need to corroborate the complainant's testimony to prosecute and to convict a defendant
of the crimes of forcible rape, sodomy, or sexual abuse." Id. at 585, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
Child abuse is also such a violent crime involving substantial risk of physical injury,
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murder rule is to be used at all, it should be used to deter and punish
conduct highly likely to result in death.
2 Child abuse has an independent felonious purpose distinct from
homicide.
Although the merger doctrine is applied most often when the un-
derlying felony is a felonious assault,I17 "the mere fact that an assault
is part of the underlying felony is not necessarily determinative of the
issue."'1 s Thus, one reason that the merger doctrine rarely applies to
felonies like rape and robbery is because they are said to have in-
dependent felonious purposes. The independent felonious purpose of
rape is non-consensual sexual intercourse, and the independent feloni-
ous purpose of armed robbery is forced acquisition of money or prop-
erty belonging to another.' 1 9 Forcible rape and armed robbery each
involve an assault with an intent to force the victim to act.' 20 While
each act involves a dangerous assaultive element, assault is not the
ultimate goal.' 2'
In states with enumerated statutes, rape and armed robbery invari-
ably appear on the list of predicate felonies,'22 or in states with
unenumerated statutes, the two crimes generally support a felony
murder instruction. The result is not so uniform when the crime at
issue is child abuse. Among the states with unenumerated statutes, 23
some courts have applied the merger doctrine, and have refused to
whereby it is difficult for the prosecution to prove intent or depraved indifference. Thus,
just as there was a specific need to lessen the prosecution's burden with regard to rape
and sexual assault, there is a need for special protections with regard to defenseless chil-
dren.
The court in Jackson held that "[d]espite amendments in the Penal Law that tend to
lessen the burden that the prosecutor and the female victim of a sex crime need to sustain
in order to convict, no legislature or law can lessen the physical pain, mental anguish,
fear and longterm impairment to the physical and mental health of a rape victim." Id. at
586, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 817. Thus, the legal community has acknowledged the violent na-
ture of the crime of rape by including rape on the felony murder statute. Id.
117. See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
118. See People v. Jackson, 172 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 218 Cal. Rptr. 637, 641 (1st Dist.
1985) (official opinion withdrawn by order of the court, Jan. 23, 1986).
119. See Note, supra note 32, at 1067, 1070;. Miller, supra note 32, at 546. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in People v. Mattison, indicated that the intent to injure short of
death is an independent felonious design. 4 Cal. 3d 177, 481 P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1971); see Comment, supra note 23, at 270.
120. Id.
121. See Note, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
123. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988); Child abuse is a basis in Kansas.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1988 & Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (1988).
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permit child abuse as a basis for felony murder. 24 The primary ra-
tionale is that child abuse lacks an independent felonious purpose
apart from assault. Other jurisdictions, however, have discerned an
independent felonious purpose, and therefore do not apply the merger
doctrine. 125 The New York State Legislature has apparently also con-
cluded that "endangering the welfare of a child" is not simple assault,
as evidenced by its designation as a separate crime.1 26 The Arkansas
124. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311
(1984).
125. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 172 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 218 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1st Dist.
1985) (official opinion withdrawn by order of the court, Jan. 23, 1986); People v. North-
rop, 132 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 182 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ist Dist. 1982).
126. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1988) (defining "endangering the
welfare of a child"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1988) (defining "assault").
If the legislature declines to adopt the proposed "aggravated child abuse" statute, the fact
that "endangering the welfare of a child" is a class A misdemeanor should not prevent
the legislature from including it on the felony murder list.
New York's present felony murder statute refers to a person who "commits or at-
tempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, aggra-
vated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1988). This provision contains thirty-six predicate
crimes are in fact felonies, two such crimes are misdemeanors - attempted arson in the
fourth degree and attempted escape in the second degree.
Thus, since New York's felony murder statute includes misdemenaors, there is no im-
pediment to adding "endangering the welfare of a child" to the underlying felony list.
Further, at the time of its enactment, 1967, such a crime was not widely publicized,
perhaps a factor in designating it a misdemeanor.
Moreover, in People ex rel. Culhane v. Sullivan, the appellate court held that
"[n]owhere in the felony murder statute of the revised laws of 1967 does it indicate that
the predicate for murder under Penal Law section 125.25 must be a felony." 139 A.D.2d
315, 319, 531 N.Y.S.2d 287, 290 (2d Dep't 1988). The supreme court noted and consid-
ered the use of the phrase "felony murder" as a term of art only. See People ex rel.
Culhane v. Sullivan, 133 Misc. 2d 181, 188, 506 N.Y.S.2d 620, 625 (Sup. Ct., Westchester
Co. 1986).
The supreme court reasoned that its reading of the comments of the staff of the States
Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, justified the court's own
belief that what both the Commission and the prior legislative history of the law dictates
is that it was the underlying conduct, i.e., the substantive crime itself and not its classifica-
tion as a misdemeanor and/or felony, which served both the original purpose of the doc-
trine and its continued viability in that such conduct of crime and their attempts were in
and of themselves so potentially dangerous to human life that such constitutes a predicate
basis for the charge of murder, should death occur. Id. at 189, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 626. The
court continued that:
[i]n construing the provisions of the Penal Law, the legislature has stated that
the enumerated crimes therein are such as to, inter alia, 'proscribe conduct
which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm to in-
dividual or public interests ... to differentiate ... and prescribe proportionate
penalties therefor ... [and to] insure the public safety by preventing the com-
mission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences ....
Id. at 190, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
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Supreme Court, in Midgett v. State,'27 found that in cases where a
child is abused over a period of time, the reasonable inference is that
the defendant did not expect the death of the child, but expected "the
child [to] live so that the abuse may be administered again and
again." 12s Additionally, maliciously punishing or maliciously disci-
plining a child has an independent purpose, other than to simply in-
jure the child. Punishment and chastisement are means used to bend
a child's actions into conformity with a parent's idea of propriety, and
to impress upon the child the virtue of obedience. 2 9
California courts have held that child abuse may serve as an under-
lying felony for felony murder. 130 The felony of inflicting cruel or
inhuman corporal punishment on a child is described in Section 273d
of the California Penal Code as: "[the] willful[][] inflict[ion] upon
any child [of] any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury
resulting in a traumatic condition . -131 According to the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals in People v. Jackson,132 "conduct violative of
Penal Code section 273d is abstractly and by definition inherently
dangerous and will support a second degree felony-murder instruc-
tion."' 133 The court held that child abuse may have several independ-
ent purposes: to punish, to chastise, to force the child's conformity
with the father's idea of propriety, and to impress upon the child the
virtues of obedience and discipline.'34 While an intent such as chas-
tisement is not in itself felonious, the "intent to chastise in a 'cruel or
inhuman' (inherently dangerous) manner is felonious."' 13
Even though abuse was included within the facts of the homicide,
Jackson reasoned that a court still may determine whether the con-
duct that ultimately caused the homicide had an independent feloni-
ous purpose, rather than a single course of conduct with a single
127. 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987).
128. Id. at 285, 729 S.W.2d at 413.
129. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 172 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 218 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1st Dist.
1985) (official opinion withdrawn by order of the court, Jan. 23, 1986); People v. North-
rop, 132 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 182 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1st Dist. 1982).
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273d (West 1988).
132. 172 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 218 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1st Dist. 1985) (official opinion with-
drawn by order of the court, Jan. 23, 1986). In Jackson, the defendant appealed a convic-
tion of second degree murder of his son on the ground that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on second degree felony murder. That decision was subsequently
affirmed. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted a hearing and retransferred the case to
the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of its decision in People v. Smith, 35 Cal.
3d 798, 678 P.2d 886, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1984).
133. 218 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
134. Id. at 641.
135. Id.
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purpose to inflict physical harm.136
The Jackson court, in holding that the defendant had such an in-
dependent purpose, relied heavily on the testimony of a psychia-
trist, 137 who testified that the defendant's motive in inflicting pain and
suffering on the child "was to make the child become aware, remem-
ber and give him respect and become an obedient child, for the pur-
pose of making him into an obedient adult."'' 3  The court declared
that the father had no intention of killing his son when he began to
chastise him; he intended to discipline, not murder his child. 39 It is
precisely such an unintentional but "imminently foreseeable" death
that the felony murder rule was designed to prevent and punish."4
In contrast, the Supreme Court of California, in People v. Smith,"'
held that "[iun cases in which the violation of section 273a, subdivi-
sion (1), is a direct assault on a child that results in death,... it is
plain that the purpose of the child abuse was the 'very assault which
resulted in death.' "142 Section 273a(l) provides: "[a]ny person who,
under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or in-
flicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having
the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person
or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits
such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health is
endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding 1 year . .. "I"
In Smith, the defendant mother not only permitted her live-in com-
panion to beat her daughter, but she assisted him in striking, biting,
and inflicting unjustifiable pain upon the two-year old girl, causing the
child's death. 144 The Smith court held that the child abuse merged
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 643.
140. Id. Similarly, the California Court of Appeals in People v. Northrop held that
felony child abuse may be committed without an intent to inflict injuries, thus having a
felonious design independent of the resulting homicide. 132 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 197 (1st Dist. 1982). In that case, the 22-month old victim died from organ dam-
age and bone injuries resulting from the infliction of blunt force. Id. at 1032, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 199.
141. 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1984)
142. Id. at 806, 678 P.2d at 891, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 316. Although Jackson distin-
guished Smith legally in that the latter was based upon § 273a(l), rather than upon
§ 273d, Jackson did not appear to limit its holding to such a legal distinction.
143. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1988).
144. See Smith, 35 Cal. 3d at 801, 678 P.2d at 887, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 312. The Smith
court rejected Northrop because the former found no "independent design when the
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into the homicide and could not constitute an underlying felony for
felony murder.
In Jackson,45 the defendant had appealed a conviction of second
degree murder of his son on the ground that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on second degree felony murder."46 That decision
was subsequently affirmed.' 47 Thereafter, the United States Supreme
Court granted a hearing and remanded the case to the California
Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of its decision in People
v. Smith. 4 ' The California Court of Appeals, conceding that the two
cases were factually close, distinguished them on the legal issues
presented: in Smith, the issue was the validity of a felony murder
instruction based upon violation of Penal Code section 273a(1),
whereas Jackson concerned the validity of such an instruction based
upon violation of Penal Code section 273d.'49 The Jackson court de-
termined that Smith did not control. 150 Although Jackson distin-
guished Smith statutorily, it did not appear to limit its holding to that
distinction.' 5' The Jackson court found an independent motive of dis-
cipline; in Smith the Supreme Court did not find, on the facts, such an
independent purpose.5 2
crime of felony child abuse of the assaultive variety is willfully committed under such
circumstances." Smith, 35 Cal. 3d at 808, 678 P.2d at 892, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 317. How-
ever, in concluding that child abuse under § 273d did not merge with the homicide, the
California Court of Appeal in Jackson, agreed with Northrop's reasoning that child abuse
may have an independent purpose, depending upon the circumstances of the case.
145. 172 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 218 Cal. Rptr 637 (1 Dist. 1985) (official opinion with-
drawn by order of the court, Jan. 23, 1986).
146. 218 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
147. Id.
148. 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1984).
149. Jackson, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
150. 218 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
151. Id.
152. Factually, it was conceivable for the Court in Smith to have determined that the
defendant also was bent upon discipline, however the Court declined to do so. See Smith,
35 Cal. 3d at 801, 678 P.2d at 887, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
Thus, the purpose behind child abuse is often an independent or collateral one, sepa-
rate from the intent to inflict great bodily harm. The intent to inflict bodily harm without
causing death is not in itself a collateral purpose, and is therefore the reason for applying
the merger doctrine to assault.
Similar to California and Kansas, Georgia's Official Criminal Code declares that "[a]
person .... commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony he causes
the death of another human being irrespective of malice." See GA. CRIM. CODE § 16-5-
l(c) (Official version 1988). The Georgia courts have permitted child abuse to serve as
the underlying felony for felony murder, thus rejecting the merger doctrine as applied to
child abuse. See Hendrick v. State, 257 Ga. 514, 361 S.E.2d 169 (1987); White v. State,
251 Ga. 482, 306 S.E.2d 636 (1983). In Hendrick, the defendant was convicted of mur-
dering his two-year old son, who was found with arm fractures, bruises, and head injuries
which had occurred over a period of several weeks. See Hendrick, 257 Ga. at 515, 361
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Smith held that the statute underlying the defendant's prosecution
merged with the homicide. Section 273a of the California Criminal
Code, however, criminalized a broad range of conduct, including ac-
tive and passive, as well as violent and non-violent. This statute is
strikingly similar to New York's Penal Law section 260.10, "endan-
gering the welfare of a child." Since both statutes are overbroad it is
understandable why the Smith Court applied the merger doctrine.
In contrast, because the proposed "aggravated child abuse" statute
that this Note proposes involves only dangerous and active crimes
against children, it is sufficiently narrow to distinguish it from the two
statutes. Indeed, the proposed "aggravated child abuse" is more simi-
lar to section 273d of the California Criminal Code, which Jackson
held did not merge with the homicide.
4. Child Abuse is a unique crime.
Child abuse is most often committed in the privacy of the abuser's
home, where there are no witnesses other than the abuser himself. As
a result, it is extremely difficult to prosecute child abuse cases, and
even more difficult to obtain a murder conviction when death results.
Because child abuse is omitted from the list of underlying felonies
for felony murder in New York, the most severe penalty realistically
available to the government is manslaughter. 3 The recent Steinberg
case illustrates this limitation.1 5 4 The jury acquitted Joel Steinberg of
the most serious charge of second degree murder based on depraved
indifference to human life and convicted him of first degree man-
slaughter because several jurors doubted whether his failure to get
medical aid constituted "depraved indifference."' 5 5 The availability
of felony murder in this case would have enabled the jury to avoid
making difficult, subtle distinctions among depraved indifference to
human life, intent to cause serious physical injury, and recklessly
causing the death of another human being. 56 The jury would then
have been able to convict Steinberg of second degree murder once it
found that the defendant committed the abuse that resulted in the
S.E.2d at 170. The cause of death was blunt head trauma that damaged the brain. Id. In
White, the child died of peritonitis caused by rough, rapid insertion into the child's rec-
tum by some object at least two to three inches long with a sharp roughened point. See
White, 306 S.E.2d at 638, 251 Ga. at 483. In both cases, the court allowed the child
abuse to serve as the predicate for felony murder. See Hendrick, 257 Ga. at 515, 361
S.E.2d at 170; White, 251 Ga. at 485, 306 S.E.2d at 639.
153. See Reich, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
155. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
156. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1989, at B5, col. 2.
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death of the six-year old child.1 5 7
IV. Conclusion
Applying the felony murder rule to child abuse will serve three very
important functions. First, the rule provides greater clarity to the
jury by removing from its consideration imprecise definitions of intent
and depraved indifference. 5 '
Second, by severely punishing those who cause the death of chil-
dren through some form of abuse, the rule will deter parents from
beating, neglecting, or "playing" with their children in an inhumane
manner. 59 This public policy was emphasized by the court in Jack-
son, which observed that:-
[a] rational and well-ordered society through its judicial system
should seek to protect its most fragile and vulnerable members by
providing, as a deterrent to deaths occurring in the course of 'cruel
or inhuman' attacks against them, a harsher penalty for killings
resulting therefrom[.] [This] seems to us to be entirely congruent
with fundamental principles of elementary justice and sound legis-
lative policy."'°
Third, the felony murder rule satisfies society's sense of outrage' 6'
over the killing of a child. Our laws must severely punish those who
violate the sanctity of a child's life, in order to preserve the public's
trust in and need for justice. 62
The felony murder rule will help to protect a child from an abusive
situation in which there is a great probability of serious injury or
death.163 If the "aggravated child abuse" statute is not adopted to
serve as an underlying felony to felony murder, then a parent who
157. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1988). N.Y. Times, Jan.
31, 1989, at B5, col. 2. Professor Stephen Gillers, New York University School of Law,
expressed the feelings of many when he said, referring to Joel Steinberg, "I think he got
away with murder." Daily News, Jan. 31, 1989, at 22, Col. 1.
158. See Crump, supra note 34, at 382.
159. See People v. Jackson, 172 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 218 Cal. Rptr. 637, 641 (1st Dist.
1985) (official opinion withdrawn by order of the court, Jan. 23, 1986).
160. 218 Cal.. Rptr. at 642 n.2. The court in Jackson said:
[w]e are painfully aware of the fact that in the area of child abuse greater deter-
rence is sorely needed. Statistics from the State of California reveal that in
1981, 28,579 cases of physical abuse were reported statewide, of which 79 re-
sulted in fatalities. The moral cost of these terrifying statistics is incalculable.
218 Cal. Rptr. at 642 n.2.
161. 218 Cal. Rptr. at 642 n.2. See supra note 5. "Outrage" is defined as: "A grave
injury; injurious violence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (6th ed. 1990).
162. See generally People v. Jackson, 172 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 218 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1st
Dist. 1985) (official opinion withdrawn by order of the court, Jan. 23, 1986).
163. See People v. Jaramillo, 98 Cal. App. 3d 830, 159 Cal. Rptr. 771 (2d Dist. 1979).
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beats a child to death may never be convicted of murder, which is the
ultimate crime.164
Barry Bendetowies
164. See Reich, supra note 9.
